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Nonimmigrants, Equal Protection, and the
Supremacy Clause
I. INTRODUCTION
At the intersection of immigration and equal protection lies a
judicial vortex. This area of law is a twilight zone of sorts, where
established constitutional principles do not follow their regular
paths.1 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
applies to all who fall within the jurisdiction of a state, including
noncitizens.2 Generally, the same equal protection restrictions placed
on state laws through the Fourteenth Amendment also restrict
federal law through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.3 But the Constitution gives Congress exclusive power
over immigration, which the Supreme Court has interpreted as a
plenary power that is not subject to traditional judicial review.4 Thus,
discriminatory laws that would incur rigorous judicial review if
passed by state legislatures are given, at most, a rational basis review
if passed by Congress.5
Furthermore, laws passed by the states, whether discriminatory
or not, are invalid under the Supremacy Clause if they impose upon
Congress’s exclusive authority to regulate immigration. If Congress
expressly grants certain privileges to noncitizens, state laws that
revoke those privileges will be preempted. The Supremacy Clause,
therefore, is an unwitting companion to the Equal Protection Clause
in striking down discriminatory state laws.
Courts handling cases of state discrimination against noncitizens
typically review the offending state law under both the Equal
Protection Clause and the Supremacy Clause. But the courts either
evaluate the two clauses separately, as alternative holdings, or they
1. “[I]mmigration is an area in which the normal rules of constitutional law simply do
not apply.” Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional
Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 260.
2. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
3. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 364–65 n.4 (1974).
4. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81–82 (1976).
5. “[I]t is not ‘political hypocrisy’ to recognize that the Fourteenth Amendment’s
limits on state powers are substantially different from the constitutional provisions applicable to
the federal power over immigration and naturalization.” Id. at 86–87.
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blur the line between the two clauses by using Supremacy Clause
justifications to invalidate state laws under the Equal Protection
Clause. More disconcerting, however, is that courts differ on the
proper equal protection review standard to apply to one particular
class of noncitizen: nonimmigrants.
How equal protection applies to discriminatory state laws
depends on the immigration status of the noncitizen who protests
the law—some are given more protection than others. There are
three broad classes of noncitizens in the United States: permanent
residents, nonimmigrants, and illegal immigrants. Permanent
residents are most similar to citizens.6 They are entitled to live in the
United States permanently.7 Nonimmigrants enter the country for a
variety of reasons and under a variety of conditions, but are generally
only here temporarily.8 Illegal immigrants, as the title suggests, are
noncitizens who enter or stay in the United States without
permission.
State laws have discriminated against all three of these classes,
but the standard of equal protection review is not always clear. The
Supreme Court has held that state laws that discriminate based on
“alienage” are subject to strict scrutiny review under the Equal
Protection Clause. But the Court has not defined “alienage” and has
only applied strict scrutiny when permanent residents challenge
discriminatory state laws. With one specific exception, the Court has
stated that laws discriminating against illegal immigrants are only
subject to a rational basis review.
Nonimmigrants, however, do not enjoy a well-defined standard
of review. The Supreme Court has avoided the issue, leaving a legal
gap that has led to disagreement among lower courts. Some courts
argue that laws discriminating against nonimmigrants should only be
given a rational basis review because the Supreme Court has applied
strict scrutiny only when permanent residents protest discriminatory
laws. Other courts, however, argue that these discriminatory laws
should be reviewed using strict scrutiny because “alienage”
discrimination includes all aliens and general language used by the
Supreme Court does not limit that interpretation.
6. “Resident aliens, like citizens, pay taxes, support the economy, serve in the Armed
Forces, and contribute in myriad other ways to our society.” In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722
(1973).
7. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (2006).
8. See id. § 1101(a)(15).
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This debate, however, frequently ignores the rationale for giving
any class heightened equal protection scrutiny. Supreme Court cases
have identified characteristics of discrete classes that justify
heightened scrutiny, but lower court cases discussing nonimmigrants
as a class have brushed over these characteristics. Classifying
nonimmigrants, however, presents a unique problem: they are a
heterogeneous class. Congress allows nonimmigrants to enter the
country for a variety of reasons and under a variety of restrictions.9
Discriminatory state laws may touch upon characteristics shared by
one subclass of nonimmigrants but not others. This Comment
proposes a two-step analysis which resolves these issues.
Because Congress has plenary power over immigration, courts
should approach discriminatory state laws by first evaluating their
constitutionality under the Supremacy Clause. If Congress, for
example, grants rights to nonimmigrants, state laws revoking or
infringing on those rights are preempted and invalid. There is no
need for an equal protection analysis in these cases. Furthermore,
starting an analysis with a Supremacy Clause evaluation eliminates
problems associated with the heterogeneous nature of the
nonimmigrant class because federal immigration law accounts for the
differences between the subclasses.
If a discriminatory state law is not invalid under the Supremacy
Clause, a court should then analyze it under the Equal Protection
Clause with the level of scrutiny based on the class of immigrants at
issue. Classes traditionally receiving heightened equal protection
scrutiny share certain characteristics, such as political powerlessness.
But some of these classes are only given an intermediate level of
heightened scrutiny, likely because they have mitigating
circumstances which may lessen the discriminatory impact of state
laws. Because nonimmigrants share characteristics with classes that
receive heightened scrutiny but also have mitigating characteristics,
they should also be given an intermediate level of scrutiny for equal
protection challenges to discriminatory state laws.

9. See id.
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Part II of this Comment reviews the constitutionality of state
laws that discriminate against noncitizens under the Equal Protection
Clause and the Supremacy Clause and discusses the gap in
jurisprudence for equal protection of nonimmigrants. Part III
introduces the two-step analysis proposed by this Comment. Part IV
applies this proposal to two actual cases and one hypothetical case.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DISCRIMINATORY LAWS
Although this Comment advocates a two-step analysis beginning
with the Supremacy Clause and then moving on to the Equal
Protection Clause, the jurisprudence has developed in reverse order.
Supreme Court cases reviewing state laws that discriminated against
noncitizens traditionally focused on the Equal Protection Clause.10
Eventually, however, the Supremacy Clause crept in as an alternate
rationale for overturning discriminatory state laws.11 As federal
immigration law has become more detailed, a stronger use of the
Supremacy Clause has emerged,12 but the need for equal protection
analysis has not dissipated. Courts continue to face discriminatory
state laws that are not preempted by federal immigration law.
A. Striking Down Discriminatory Laws Under
the Equal Protection Clause
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits a state from denying equal protection to “any person
within its jurisdiction.”13 Three general levels of constitutional review
are applied to equal protection cases.14 The highest level of review,
strict scrutiny, applies in two different situations: (1) when the party
claiming discrimination fits into a suspect class and the
discrimination is based on that classification or (2) when the
discrimination denies any individual a fundamental right.15 To pass
10. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
11. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376–80 (1971).
12. See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10–17 (1982) (finding that the complicated
scheme Congress employed for G-4 nonimmigrants preempted a discriminatory state law).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
14. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (“[W]e apply different levels of
scrutiny to different types of classifications.”).
15. See id. (noting that “[c]lassifications based on race or national origin and
classifications affecting fundamental rights are given the most exacting scrutiny” (citations
omitted)).
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strict scrutiny, a “law must advance a compelling state interest by the
least restrictive means available.”16 Intermediate scrutiny applies
when the discrimination is against members of specifically identified
classes, often referred to as quasi-suspect classes.17 To pass
intermediate scrutiny, a state law “must be substantially related to an
important governmental objective.”18 Finally, the lowest level of
scrutiny, rational basis, applies to cases that do not fit any of these
classifications.19 A state law is valid under rational basis if it is
“rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”20
1. Equal protection for permanent residents
In Yick Wo v. Hopkins the Supreme Court held that “[t]he
fourteenth amendment [sic] . . . is not confined to the protection of
citizens,”21 but also provides protection for noncitizens within the
jurisdiction of each state. Nearly sixty years later, the Court first
applied strict scrutiny review when it declared race to be a suspect
classification.22 The Court subsequently declared alienage to be a
suspect classification and used strict scrutiny to invalidate state laws
that “create[d] two classes . . . , indistinguishable except with respect
to whether they are or are not citizens of this country.”23
Despite this broad language, the Supreme Court has only used
strict scrutiny to review state laws that discriminate against
permanent residents. In Graham v. Richardson, the Court

16. Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219 (1984).
17. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 437–38 (1985).
Quasi-suspect classes include non-marital children and women. Clark, 486 U.S. at 461.
18. Clark, 486 U.S. at 461; see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (“[The
law] must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives.”).
19. See Clark, 486 U.S. at 461.
20. New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
21. 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982) (“[A]n
alien is surely a ‘person’ in any ordinary sense of that term. Aliens . . . have long been
recognized as ‘persons’ guaranteed due process [and equal protection] of law by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.”).
22. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (“[A]ll legal restrictions
which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say
that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the
most rigid scrutiny.”).
23. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971). “But the Court’s decisions have
established that classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are
inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.” Id. at 371–72 (citations omitted).
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invalidated the welfare assistance laws of two states. Arizona required
beneficiaries of an assistance program to either be citizens or to have
lived in the United States for at least fifteen years.24 Pennsylvania’s
program denied assistance to all noncitizens regardless of years of
residence.25 Permanent residents protested both statutes, and the
Court found that neither passed strict scrutiny.26 Given that the
permanent residents paid the same taxes, the states’ interest in
preserving resources for citizens or long-term residents was not
compelling.27
Based on alienage classifications, the Supreme Court has used
strict scrutiny to invalidate laws that required permanent residents to
submit an application for citizenship to qualify for college financial
aid,28 that denied permanent residents admission to a state bar,29 and
that prevented permanent residents from obtaining engineering
licenses.30 A common thread throughout these cases is that the law at
issue either specifically singled out permanent residents or the law
singled out noncitizens generally but was challenged in court only by
permanent residents. “Thus far, the Supreme Court has reviewed
with strict scrutiny only state laws affecting permanent resident
aliens.”31
Using strict scrutiny for state laws that discriminate against
permanent residents is logical because permanent residents are part
of the permanent social fabric of the United States.32 “Given the
extent to which resident aliens are legally entrenched in American

24. Id. at 367, 371.
25. Id. at 368, 371.
26. Id. at 367–68, 374–76.
27. “There can be no ‘special public interest’ in tax revenues to which aliens have
contributed on an equal basis with the residents of the State.” Id. at 376.
28. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977). While the statute did not single out resident
aliens specifically, the wording of the statute exempted refugees paroled in the U.S. and those
who did not qualify for citizenship but expressed intent to do so once they qualified. Id. at 3–
4.
29. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
30. Examining Bd. of Eng’rs, Architects, & Suveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572
(1976).
31. LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 415 (5th Cir. 2005).
32. With certain exceptions, permanent residents are entitled to live and work
indefinitely in the United States. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) governs the
rights of permanent residents to maintain their immigration status and stay in the United
States. For example, INA § 237(a)(2) provides grounds for deportation based on the
commission of certain crimes. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (2006).
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society, their inability to participate in the political process qualifies
them as ‘a prime example of a discrete and insular minority for
whom [] heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.’”33
But there is an exception to this rule. If a state or local
government prohibits a permanent resident from holding a position
which carries a political function, the law will be reviewed under a
rational basis standard.34 The Supreme Court has “concluded that
strict scrutiny is out of place when the restriction primarily serves a
political function.”35 Permanent residents are excludable from these
positions “because this country entrusts many of its most important
policy responsibilities to these officers . . . . [I]t represents the
choice, and right, of the people to be governed by their citizen
peers.”36
2. Equal protection for illegal immigrants
In 1982 the Supreme Court addressed the question of what
equal protection standard of review to apply to state laws that
discriminate against illegal immigrants.37 The Court indicated that
laws discriminating against illegal immigrants will generally receive a
rational basis review.38
But the case, Plyler v. Doe, was about a subset of the illegal
immigrant class, and the Court carved out an exception. It held as
unconstitutional a Texas statute that denied illegal-immigrant

33. LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 417 (alteration in original) (quoting Griffiths, 413 U.S. at
721). Note that the Supreme Court did not limit this argument to permanent residents but
included all “aliens” in the original sentence. The Fifth Circuit limited the reach of this quote
to permanent residents. The quoted language, however, comes from a case in which the
plaintiff was a permanent resident. Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 718.
34. See generally Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413
U.S. 634 (1973). “This narrow ‘political-function’ exception to the strict-scrutiny standard is
based on the ‘State’s historical power to exclude aliens from participation in its democratic
political institutions.’” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 476–77 (1991) (White, J.,
concurring in part) (quoting Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 648).
35. Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 439 (1982).
36. Foley, 435 U.S. at 296.
37. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
38. See id. at 219 n.19 (“We reject the claim that ‘illegal aliens’ are a ‘suspect class.’”);
see also id. at 223 (“Undocumented aliens cannot be treated as a suspect class because their
presence in this country in violation of federal law is not a ‘constitutional irrelevancy.’”).
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students admission to public elementary schools.39 The Court
applied an intermediate-scrutiny-in-disguise review to come to this
holding. The opinion looked to see if the state regulation was
“rational,”40 suggesting a rational basis review. But in determining
whether the state interest was rational, the Court required it to
further a “substantial goal of the State,”41 suggesting an intermediate
scrutiny level of review.42 Thus the Court required something more
than just a mere rational basis. Indeed, concurring and dissenting
opinions acknowledged that the majority applied some level of
intermediate scrutiny.43 The Fifth Circuit has labeled the standard
used by the Plyler Court as a “modified rational basis review.”44
3. Equal protection for nonimmigrants
The Supreme Court has not explicitly determined what equal
protection standard of review to apply to state laws that discriminate
against nonimmigrants. Lower courts have interpreted this silence
differently. Some have held that alienage discrimination applies only
to permanent residents and that state laws discriminating against
nonimmigrants receive only a rational basis review under the Equal
Protection Clause. These courts point out that the Supreme Court
has applied strict scrutiny only to cases where the protesting plaintiff
is a permanent resident.45

39. Id. at 230. The offending statute also contained a provision that withheld education
funds “for the education of children who were not ‘legally admitted’ into the United States”
from school districts that enrolled illegal immigrants. Id. at 205.
40. Id. at 224.
41. Id.
42. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (“To withstand intermediate scrutiny,
a statutory classification must be substantially related to an important governmental
objective.”).
43. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 239 (Powell, J., concurring) (“In these unique circumstances,
the Court properly may require that the State’s interests be substantial.” (emphasis added)). In
dissenting, Chief Justice Burger argued that rational basis is the proper test, not the
intermediate scrutiny advocated by the majority. “Once it is conceded—as the Court does—
that illegal aliens are not a suspect class, and that education is not a fundamental right, our
inquiry should focus on and be limited to whether the legislative classification at issue bears a
rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.” Id. at 248 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
44. LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 416 (5th Cir. 2005).
45. Id. (“The Court has never applied strict scrutiny review to a state law affecting any
other alienage classifications, e.g., illegal aliens, the children of illegal aliens, or nonimmigrant
aliens.”).
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The Fifth and Sixth Circuits have expressly adopted the rational
basis review for state laws that single-out nonimmigrants.46 In
LeClerc v. Webb, for example, the Fifth Circuit used rational basis to
review the Louisiana State Bar’s rule of only admitting citizens and
permanent residents.47 The plaintiffs were nonimmigrants who held
student visas and temporary work visas.48 All were denied bar
admission based on their immigration status.49 The court explained
that permanent residents receive higher scrutiny because they “are
similarly situated to citizens in their economic, social, and civic (as
opposed to political) conditions.”50 The court examined the
differences between permanent residents and nonimmigrants and
“conclude[d] that although aliens are a suspect class in general, they
are not homogeneous and precedent does not support the
proposition that nonimmigrant aliens are a suspect class entitled to
have state legislative classifications concerning them subjected to
strict scrutiny.”51
Other courts argue that strict scrutiny is the proper standard of
review for state laws that discriminate against nonimmigrants. These
courts focus on the broad meaning of “alienage” and the general
language used by the Supreme Court when it found alienage
discrimination to be a suspect classification.52 In Kirk v. New York
Department of Education, the district court struck down a New York

46. See id. at 419 (“[T]he Supreme Court has yet expressly to bestow equal protection
status on nonimmigrant aliens. . . . [A]lthough aliens are a suspect class in general, they are not
homogeneous and precedent does not support the proposition that nonimmigrant aliens are a
suspect class entitled to have state legislative classifications concerning them subjected to strict
scrutiny.”) (footnote omitted); LULAC v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 533 (6th Cir. 2007)
(“There are abundant good reasons, both legal and pragmatic, why lawful permanent residents
are the only subclass of aliens who have been treated as a suspect class. This case presents no
compelling reason why the special protection afforded by suspect-class recognition should be
extended to lawful temporary resident aliens. Because the instant classification does not result
in discriminatory harm to members of a suspect class, it is subject only to rational basis
scrutiny.”).
47. 419 F.3d at 410.
48. Id. at 410–12.
49. Id. at 411.
50. Id. at 418 (footnote omitted).
51. Id. at 419. The court also rejected using intermediate scrutiny to review the law. Id.
at 419–20.
52. See, e.g., Kirk v. N.Y. Dep’t of Educ., 562 F. Supp. 2d 405, 411 (W.D.N.Y. 2008)
(“[B]ased on its reading of the aforementioned decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, which
refer to classifications based on ‘alienage’ generally as being inherently suspect. . . . the Court
finds that the challenged statute must be reviewed under the strict scrutiny standard.”).
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state law which denied veterinarian licenses to nonimmigrants.53 The
district court rejected the Fifth and Sixth Circuit holdings which only
used the rational basis standard to review state laws that discriminate
against nonimmigrants.54
When it declared alienage as a suspect classification, the Supreme
Court referred to aliens generally—“Aliens as a class are a prime
example of a ‘discrete and insular’ minority for whom such
heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.”55 Also, when
summarizing state laws invalidated under a strict scrutiny standard,
the Supreme Court stated that the offending laws “struck at the
noncitizens’ ability to exist in the community”—the Court did not
limit this analysis to permanent residents.56
Judge Stewart, who dissented on this issue in LeClerc, echoed
these arguments: “In discussing the alien suspect class, the Supreme
Court has referred to resident aliens, aliens and non-citizens
interchangeably.”57 He also noted that “alienage” is defined in
Black’s Law Dictionary as “the state or condition of being an alien”
and an alien is defined in the federal immigration law as “any person
not a citizen or national of the United States.”58 Thus, according to
Judge Stewart and the district court in Kirk, the Supreme Court
intended for strict scrutiny to apply to laws that discriminate against
nonimmigrants and not just permanent residents. Other courts have
taken the same approach.59
Lack of a solid, logical standard for reviewing state laws that
discriminate against nonimmigrants creates two significant problems.
The first is that nonimmigrants are treated differently depending on
the jurisdiction in which they live. The Constitution is more
protective if they live in New York and less protective if they live in

53. Id. at 407–08, 412–13.
54. Id. at 410–11.
55. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (citation omitted).
56. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 295 (1978).
57. LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 427 (5th Cir. 2005) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 426 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 79 (8th ed. 1999); 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(3) (2000)).
59. See Moreno v. Toll, 489 F. Supp. 658, 664 (D. Md. 1980), aff’d, 645 F.2d 217
(4th Cir. 1981), aff’d 458 U.S. 1 (1982) (“The court concludes that the Supreme Court cases
cited have in principle wrapped all resident aliens, both immigrant and nonimmigrant, in the
suspect classification blanket.”); Tayyari v. N.M. State Univ., 495 F. Supp. 1365, 1368, 1372–
73 (D.N.M. 1980) (using strict scrutiny to analyze how a state law affected both permanent
resident and nonimmigrant plaintiffs).
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Louisiana. The second problem is that, in light of Plyler, a subset of
illegal immigrants is given a higher level of protection than
nonimmigrants living in certain jurisdictions. Not only does this
offend fundamental equality, it also seems to contravene the
immigration scheme set up by Congress—some noncitizens without
permission to enter the country are better protected than other
noncitizens who do have permission to enter the country.
The debate between judges over the application of equal
protection to nonimmigrants focuses on what the Supreme Court
means by “alienage” discrimination. While both sides have legitimate
arguments, neither focuses on the qualities that the Supreme Court
traditionally looks for when determining whether a class deserves a
heightened level of scrutiny.60
B. The Heterogeneity Problem: Difficulty in Finding a
Logical Standard
A key characteristic of classes that benefit from heightened equal
protection scrutiny is political powerlessness.61 Nonimmigrants are
politically powerless. But the nonimmigrant class is a heterogeneous
group, making it difficult to develop a uniform standard of review
applicable to all subclasses of nonimmigrants. Federal immigration
law gives specific privileges to some nonimmigrants but not to
others, and some nonimmigrants enter the country under stricter
limitations than others. For example, some nonimmigrants stay in
the United States for short periods of time, while others can be here
for lengthy periods.62 Some nonimmigrants can only stay in certain
geographical locations within the United States.63 Some
nonimmigrants are subject to strict limitations on work
authorization, while others are free to pursue employment
opportunities.64 Thus, the nonimmigrant class is heterogeneous
60. The court in LeClerc did make an attempt to evaluate some of these characteristics,
but the holding was based on the court’s interpretation of the Supreme Court’s meaning of
“alienage.” See LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 415–19.
61. See discussion infra Part III.B.1.
62. Compare “visitors” who stay in the United States for only one year, with some
possibility for extension, to “Foreign Government Officials” who could potentially stay
indefinitely. 8 C.F.R. §§ 214.2(a)(1), (b)(1) (2010).
63. “Transits” are “limited to transit to and from the United Nations Headquarters
District.” 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(c)(2) (2010).
64. For example, nonimmigrants who come to the United States to attend college are
only allowed limited opportunities to work. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(9) (2010). But children of
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because its members enter the United States for different reasons,
under different conditions, and under different obligations.
The Supreme Court has refused to use heightened equal
protection scrutiny, (anything more than a rational basis), for
heterogeneous classes that are “large, diverse, and amorphous.”65 In
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center the Court found that
mental handicap is not a quasi-suspect classification and state laws
that discriminate based on that classification should not be reviewed
using heightened scrutiny.66 Among the reasons the Court cited for
refusing to apply heightened scrutiny was that the class of those who
suffer from mental handicaps is amorphous.
[T]hey range from those whose disability is not immediately
evident to those who must be constantly cared for. . . . How this
large and diversified group is to be treated under the law is a
difficult and often a technical matter, very much a task for
legislators guided by qualified professionals and not by the perhaps
ill-informed opinions of the judiciary.67

If the Court were to declare one “large and amorphous” class as
quasi-suspect, it would have a hard time distinguishing other
amorphous classes, such as “the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill,
and the infirm.”68

foreign officers of certain international organizations are subject to more liberal rules for work
authorization. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(g)(5) (2010).
65. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
66. 473 U.S. 432, 435 (1985).
67. Id. at 442–43 (footnote omitted).
68. Id. at 446. The Court cited several other reasons for not applying heightened
scrutiny. State and federal legislatures were actively pursuing laws to protect those with mental
handicaps, eliminating the need for judicial oversight. Id. at 443–44. Furthermore, the
existence of positive legislation “negates any claim that the mentally retarded are politically
powerless in the sense that they have no ability to attract the attention of the lawmakers.” Id.
at 445. The Court also looked at the fact that “those who are mentally retarded have a reduced
ability to cope with and function in the everyday world.” Id. at 442. These limitations justified
laws that single out members of the class. “Such legislation thus singling out the retarded for
special treatment reflects the real and undeniable differences between the retarded and others.”
Id. at 444. A heightened standard of review for such laws would hinder legislatures’ ability to
accommodate these limitations. The Court noted that intermediate scrutiny is used when the
characteristic at issue “bears ‘no relation to the individual’s ability to participate in and
contribute to society.’” Id. at 441 (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976)).
However, these reasons do not apply to nonimmigrants. Nonimmigrants lack political power.
Positive legislation to protect those suffering from mentally retardation likely exists because
they have family members who are politically powerful and can pass legislation on their behalf.
Nonimmigrants do not have this same support. Also, state laws that discriminate against
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Courts that evaluate the issue of equal protection for
nonimmigrants, therefore, face a dilemma: the class consists of
individuals in various circumstances, making it difficult to classify
nonimmigrants into one well-defined group; but the class also suffers
from the inability to protect itself from discriminatory state laws.
The Supreme Court likely recognized this dilemma when it
decided Toll v. Moreno.69 The issue of equal protection for
nonimmigrants was directly before the Court, but it declined to
address the equal protection issue and relied instead on the
Supremacy Clause to find a discriminatory law unconstitutional.70
With this opinion, the Court demonstrated that the Supremacy
Clause is often an easier way to analyze state laws that single out
nonimmigrants. But to understand how the Supremacy Clause
invalidates discriminatory state laws, a foundational knowledge of
Congress’s plenary power over immigration is necessary.
C. Is the Supremacy Clause the Answer?
Because Congress has plenary power over immigration matters,
any state law that contravenes congressional use of this power is
unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause.71 But this plenary
power also means that Congress can discriminate against noncitizens
in ways forbidden to the states. The power to regulate everything
related to immigration with minimal judicial review is derived from
judicial interpretation of the Constitution.72 Congress has plenary
authority to create laws governing “the admission and expulsion of
aliens” and “aliens’ rights and obligations” once they are in the
United States.73
nonimmigrants do so not based on their abilities but based on their immigration status. Thus,
such laws bear no relation to nonimmigrants’ ability to contribute to society.
69. 458 U.S. 1 (1982).
70. Id. at 9–10. See infra notes 93–98 and accompanying text.
71. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”).
72. “Federal authority to regulate the status of aliens derives from various sources,
including the Federal Government’s power ‘[t]o establish [a] uniform Rule of Naturalization,’
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4, its power ‘[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,’ id., cl.
3, and its broad authority over foreign affairs.” Toll, 458 U.S. at 10. For a discussion of the
plenary power see Legomsky, supra note 1.
73. Legomsky, supra note 1, at 256, 306. Legomsky states that the plenary power only
covers “admission and expulsion” powers but admits that Congress’s authority over “rights
and obligations” of noncitizens is broad and subject to the least exacting judicial review. Id. at
256.
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1. Discrimination by Congress
The Supreme Court has found that the same protections against
discriminatory state laws provided by the Equal Protection Clause
also apply against federal laws through the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.74 This principle does not apply, however, to
federal immigration law because the plenary power authorizes
Congress to discriminate. Congress would not have the ability to
exercise its authority over immigration if it were required to treat all
noncitizens the same way it treats citizens. “Congress regularly
makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.”75 For
example, Congress can pass laws denying certain classes of
noncitizens the legal right to work in the United States without
offending the equal protection aspects of the Due Process Clause.76
Any challenged federal law that discriminates against noncitizens in
general or against specific subclasses of noncitizens will be reviewed
using, at most, a rational basis standard.77

74. See Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 364 n.4 (1974) (“Although ‘the Fifth
Amendment contains no equal protection clause, it does forbid discrimination that is “so
unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.”’ Thus, if a classification would be invalid under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is also inconsistent with the due
process requirement of the Fifth Amendment.” (citations omitted)).
75. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976).
76. Students, for example, are allowed to enter the country and gain an education but
are only allowed to work under certain circumstances. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(9) (2010).
77. “In mild contrast with the plenary Congressional power over immigration, the
Supreme Court has acknowledged that federal statutes in the aliens’ rights area are reviewed
for rationality when challenged as discriminatory, though admittedly that review has not been
intensive in practice. In addition, with one rapidly expanding exception, state action classifying
on the basis of alienage has been subjected to strict scrutiny.” Legomsky, supra note 1, at 256
(footnotes omitted); see also Midi v. Holder, 566 F.3d 132, 134 (4th Cir. 2009), cert denied,
130 S. Ct. 805 (2009) (“Although courts usually subject national-origin classifications to strict
scrutiny, when such classifications involve unadmitted aliens in the immigration context, we
subject them only to rational basis review. This is so because Congress has plenary power over
immigration and naturalization, and may ‘permissibly set immigration criteria based on an
alien’s nationality,’ Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 72 (1st Cir. 2006), even though such
distinctions would be suspect if applied to American citizens.”) (citations omitted); Avila v.
Biedess, 78 P.3d 280, 285 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (depublished) (noting that courts follow a
rational basis standard for discriminatory federal laws because the “Constitution gives Congress
plenary authority to legislate on immigration and alienage issues”).
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The dynamic between equal protection and the plenary power
over immigration is not available to states.78 This principle explains
the seemingly inconsistent results in two Supreme Court cases
decided within a five-year period. In Graham v. Richardson,79 the
Supreme Court used strict scrutiny to invalidate state laws that either
denied welfare benefits to noncitizens or contained a residency
requirement to qualify for the benefits. In Mathews v. Diaz, however,
the Court upheld a federal law requiring noncitizens to be
permanent residents for five years before becoming eligible for
certain federal Medicare programs.80 The Supreme Court described
the difference between the two cases in terms of both Congress’s
plenary power over immigration and the Equal Protection Clause:
[The state rules] violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and encroach upon the exclusive federal
power over the entrance and residence of aliens. Of course, the
latter ground of decision actually supports our holding today that it
is the business of the political branches of the Federal Government,
rather than that of either the States or the Federal Judiciary, to
regulate the conditions of entry and residence of aliens. The equal
protection
analysis
also
involves
significantly
different
considerations because it concerns the relationship between aliens
and the States rather than between aliens and the Federal
Government.81

2. Discrimination by the states
In addition to justifying discrimination by Congress, the plenary
power provides a barrier against discriminatory state laws. State laws
that deny rights expressly granted by Congress to noncitizens are
preempted by federal law and are unconstitutional under the
Supremacy Clause.82 The Supreme Court cases that established strict

78. “[I]t is not ‘political hypocrisy’ to recognize that the Fourteenth Amendment’s
limits on state powers are substantially different from the constitutional provisions applicable to
the federal power over immigration and naturalization.” Mathews, 426 U.S. at 86–87.
79. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
80. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
81. Id. at 84–85 (emphasis added).
82. “The Federal Government has broad constitutional powers in determining what
aliens shall be admitted to the United States, the period they may remain, regulation of their
conduct before naturalization, and the terms and conditions of their naturalization. Under the
Constitution the states are granted no such powers; they can neither add to nor take from the
conditions lawfully imposed by Congress upon admission, naturalization and residence of
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scrutiny as the review standard for alienage discrimination under the
Equal Protection Clause also relied on the Supremacy Clause as an
alternative reason for finding the state laws unconstitutional.83
The Court has also described equal protection holdings in terms
of the Supremacy Clause by stating that strict scrutiny applies
because the state laws are inconsistent with the federal immigration
scheme:
Following Graham, a series of decisions has resulted requiring state
action to meet close scrutiny to exclude aliens as a class . . . . These
exclusions struck at the noncitizens’ ability to exist in the
community, a position seemingly inconsistent with the
congressional determination to admit the alien to permanent
residence.84

Explanations like this, however, blur the line between the Equal
Protection Clause and the Supremacy Clause, and lower courts have
used Supremacy Clause rationale to decide the equal protection
issue.85
Ten years after Graham established the strict scrutiny standard
for alienage discrimination, the Supreme Court demonstrated that it
had shifted to a stronger reliance on the Supremacy Clause to
analyze state laws.86 In Toll v. Moreno, the Court faced the question
of whether alienage discrimination includes discrimination against
nonimmigrants. Instead of answering that question, however, the

aliens in the United States or the several states. State laws which impose discriminatory burdens
upon the entrance or residence of aliens lawfully within the United States conflict with this
constitutionally derived federal power to regulate immigration, and have accordingly been held
invalid.” Takashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948).
83. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson 403 U.S. 365, 377–80 (1971) (finding state laws
that denied welfare benefits to noncitizens unconstitutional because they contravened the
immigration policy established by Congress).
84. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 295 (1978) (citations omitted).
85. See, e.g., Carlson v. Reed, 249 F.3d 876, 882–83 (9th Cir. 2001) (rejecting
appellant’s equal protection argument because California’s tuition residency scheme fits with
federal immigration law).
86. A state law that affects noncitizens will violate the Supremacy Clause if it meets one
of three tests. If the state law amounts to a direct regulation of immigration it will be invalid
because it infringes onto Congress’s exclusive authority. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354–
55 (1976). Additionally, a state law will be invalid if Congress intended to “occupy the field”
and completely oust any state power. Id. at 357–63. Finally, a state law will be invalid if it
“stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress.” Id. at 363 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
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Court relied completely on the Supremacy Clause to strike down a
discriminatory state law.
The case arose when the University of Maryland denied in-state
tuition to nonimmigrants.87 The nonimmigrants challenging the
policy were children of officers of international organizations who
were living in Maryland.88 They had been admitted to the United
States with their parents, who held G-4 visas (for officers of
international organizations such as the World Trade Organization).89
The students filed suit arguing, among other things, that the policy
violated the Equal Protection Clause and the Supremacy Clause.90
The district court followed the pattern set by the Supreme Court in
Graham and decided the case based primarily on the Equal
Protection Clause with an analysis under the Supremacy Clause as an
alternative holding.91 The court determined that the Supreme Court
had “wrapped all resident aliens, both immigrant and nonimmigrant,
in the suspect classification blanket” and struck down the university
policy based on a strict scrutiny review.92 The court of appeals
affirmed the decision with no opinion and passed the entire analysis
up to the Supreme Court.93 Thus the question of what standard of
review to apply to state laws discriminating against nonimmigrants
was directly before the Supreme Court.
But the Supreme Court expressly declined to reach the equal
protection question and instead relied completely on the Supremacy
Clause to affirm the holding.94 The Court found that Congress’s
complicated immigration scheme for G-4 nonimmigrants precluded
states from denying in-state tuition to those who had established a

87. Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 3–5 (1982). The procedural history of the case is quite
complicated. This Supreme Court decision was actually the third time the Court had heard this
particular case. The University of Maryland first concluded that the nonimmigrant students
were not entitled to in-state tuition because they were not domiciled in the state. After a
lengthy battle in the courts, the university revised its policy and determined that even if
nonimmigrants could establish domicile in the state they were not entitled to in-state tuition.
The final Supreme Court opinion dealt with the constitutionality of this revised policy. Id. at
3–9.
88. Id. at 4.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Moreno v. Toll, 489 F. Supp. 658 (1980).
92. Id. at 664.
93. Toll, 458 U.S. at 9.
94. Id. at 9–10.
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domicile within the state.95 The Court pointed out that while
Congress denied many nonimmigrants the ability to establish
domicile in the United States, nonimmigrants holding G-4 visas
were allowed to establish domicile.96 Furthermore, “an array of
treaties, international agreements, and federal statutes” exempted G4 nonimmigrants from various federal and state taxes; this was done
to induce “organizations to locate significant operations in the
United States.”97 The university’s tuition policy was invalid because
it “frustrate[d] these federal policies,” and “[t]he State may not
recoup indirectly from respondents’ parents the taxes that the
Federal Government has expressly barred the State from
collecting.”98
With this opinion, the Supreme Court demonstrated that courts
should first look to the Supremacy Clause when evaluating state laws
that discriminate against noncitizens. It stated that because the
university policy violated the Supremacy Clause, the Court had “no
occasion to consider whether the policy violate[d] the Due Process
or Equal Protection Clauses.”99 Thus state laws targeting noncitizens
are first evaluated for constitutionality under the Supremacy Clause
and, if they pass muster, are then evaluated under the Equal
Protection Clause.
This is a logical process given Congress’s exclusive and plenary
power over immigration. Furthermore, the Supremacy Clause
analysis solves the heterogeneity problem of the nonimmigrant class.
Each subclass of nonimmigrants is different because federal
immigration law makes them different. The Supremacy Clause
analysis would take into account those differences.100 At least one
commentator has advocated using only the Supremacy Clause to
evaluate state laws that discriminate against noncitizens: “Arguably,

95. Id. at 17.
96. Id. at 14.
97. Id. at 14, 16.
98. Id. at 16.
99. Id. at 10.
100. The Supreme Court in Toll noted that G-4 nonimmigrants were granted the right to
establish domicile in a state while other nonimmigrants are expressly denied this right. Id. at
14–15. Thus a state law basing in-state tuition on domicile would be improperly applied under
the Supremacy Clause if it denied those benefits to G-4 nonimmigrants, but would not be
improper as applied to other subclasses of nonimmigrants.
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it would be more consistent with the constitutional structure for the
Court to deal with these cases under the supremacy clause [sic].”101
But immigration law has not addressed all issues related to
noncitizens. The Court acknowledged this in Toll: “[W]hen
Congress has done nothing more than permit” admission to the
United States, “the proper application of the principle is likely to be
a matter of some dispute.”102 Also, not “every state enactment which
in any way deals with aliens is a regulation of immigration and thus
per se pre-empted.”103 Indeed, two weeks before deciding Toll, the
Court decided Plyler, in which it relied on the Equal Protection
Clause to strike down a state law discriminating against certain illegal
immigrants.104
Lower court cases subsequent to Toll have found the need to
analyze equal protection as it applies to nonimmigrants, and courts
continue to disagree on the proper standard.105 This highlights the
need for a clearer equal protection standard for state laws that target
nonimmigrants.106
III. DEVELOPING A LOGICAL STANDARD FOR NONIMMIGRANTS
A two-step approach will solve these issues. The first step is to
evaluate the state law under the Supremacy Clause. If the law does
not violate the Supremacy Clause, then courts move to the second
step and evaluate the law under the Equal Protection Clause using
intermediate scrutiny.
A. Supremacy Clause Review
The Supremacy Clause should be the first step in evaluating
discriminatory state laws. If federal law preempts a state law, the state
law is per se unconstitutional and there is no need to analyze the
equal protection issue. Striking down a state law based on the
Supremacy Clause is easier than evaluating the equal protection issue

101. Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Judicial Supervision of Legislative Classifications—A More
Modest Role for Equal Protection?, 1976 BYU L. REV. 89, 101.
102. Toll, 458 U.S. at 13.
103. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976).
104. See supra text accompanying notes 37–43.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 45–59.
106. It has been 25 years since the Supreme Court has decided a case dealing with equal
protection for noncitizens. The last case dealing with this issue was Toll v. Moreno.
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because a court does not have to subjectively evaluate the state
interest. Either the state regulation violates the Supremacy Clause or
it does not. “[S]tate regulation not congressionally sanctioned that
discriminates against aliens lawfully admitted to the country is
impermissible if it imposes additional burdens not contemplated by
Congress.”107
Furthermore, the initial Supremacy Clause analysis solves the
equal protection classification issues involved with heterogeneous
classes. The heterogeneous nature of the nonimmigrant class will not
prevent the application of heightened equal protection scrutiny
because the differences between subclasses of nonimmigrants are
legal in nature. The differences will be accounted for when courts
evaluate state laws under the Supremacy Clause—before they reach
the equal protection issue. “[T]he distinctions among [the subclasses
of nonimmigrants] are relevant for preemption purposes.”108 The
heterogeneous nature of the nonimmigrant class is different from the
amorphous nature of classes based on mental handicap, aging, or
physical disabilities because the limiting characteristics of these
amorphous classes are physical in nature. Congress made the
nonimmigrant class heterogeneous through immigration law.109
Thus the Supreme Court’s reasons for not using heightened scrutiny
for amorphous classes are not applicable to nonimmigrants.110
A variation on the facts in Toll illustrates this point. The plaintiffs
in Toll were all nonimmigrants from the same subclass: dependent
children of G-4 nonimmigrants.111 If, however, the plaintiffs
consisted of a mixed class of nonimmigrants, the analysis would be
different.
The original policy denied in-state tuition to all non-domiciliaries
and disallowed all nonimmigrants, including those with G-4 visas,
107. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 358 n.6.
108. LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 424 (5th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added).
109. The Supreme Court stated in Elkins v. Moreno that “[a]lthough nonimmigrant
aliens can generally be viewed as temporary visitors to the United States, the nonimmigrant
classification is by no means homogeneous with respect to the terms on which a nonimmigrant
enters the United States.” 435 U.S. 647, 665 (1978). But this statement was an observation of
federal immigration law and was not made in the context of equal protection. In the final
iteration of this case, Toll v. Moreno, the Court expressly ignored the equal protection issue and
determined the outcome based solely on the Supremacy Clause. 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982). Thus,
the Court demonstrated that the heterogeneous nature of the nonimmigrant class is resolved
by looking to the Supremacy Clause.
110. See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text.
111. See Toll, 458 U.S. at 4.
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from becoming domiciliaries.112 The revised policy acknowledged
that G-4 visa holders could become domiciled in the state, as
Congress had provided, but denied in-state tuition to all
nonimmigrants.113 In both instances, the policy violates the
Supremacy Clause as it applies to G-4 nonimmigrants.114
But if the plaintiffs consisted of a mixed class of
nonimmigrants—some with G-4 visas, some with student F-1
visas,115 and some with temporary worker H-1B visas116—the
Supremacy Clause analysis would come out differently. Both F-1 and
H-1B visa holders are “precluded . . . from establishing domicile in
the United States” by federal immigration law.117 Thus the original
policy, denying domicile to nonimmigrants, is consistent with federal
law in regards to F-1 and H-1B nonimmigrants. The revised policy
also does not violate the Supremacy Clause with respect to F-1 and
H-1B nonimmigrants. The Supreme Court found that denying instate tuition to domiciled G-4 nonimmigrants contravened federal
policy because of the tax rules that apply to G-4 nonimmigrants.118
Those tax rules do not apply to F-1 or H-1B nonimmigrants;
denying in-state tuition to them will not violate Congressional
policy. Thus, under this hypothetical, the policy is invalid under the
Supremacy Clause as applied to G-4 nonimmigrants but not as
applied to F-1 or H-1B nonimmigrants.
F-1 and HB-1 visa holders are different subclasses, but with
respect to in-state tuition, they are similarly situated. Once a state
law passes Supremacy Clause scrutiny, the heterogeneous nature of
the nonimmigrant class disappears and a court can apply heightened
equal protection scrutiny to the discriminatory state law.

112. See supra note 87.
113. See supra note 87.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 94–98.
115. An F-1 visa holder is “an alien having a residence in a foreign country which he has
no intention of abandoning, who is a bona fide student qualified to pursue a full course of
study and who seeks to enter the United States temporarily and solely for the purpose of
pursuing such a course of study,” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F)(i) (2006).
116. An H-1B visa holder is a nonimmigrant who comes to the United States to work
temporarily in “specialty occupation[s].” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) (2006). But
nothing prevents H-1B visa holders from attending college part time while they are working.
117. Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 14 (1982).
118. See supra text accompanying notes 97–98.
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B. Equal Protection Review: Intermediate Scrutiny for
Nonimmigrants
For discriminatory state laws that do not violate the Supremacy
Clause, the Supreme Court should declare intermediate scrutiny to
be the proper review standard under the Equal Protection Clause.
Nonimmigrants share characteristics that the Supreme Court looks
for when applying heightened scrutiny. But, like classes for which the
Supreme Court uses intermediate scrutiny, they also have mitigating
characteristics.
1. Heightened scrutiny for suspect classes
The famous footnote four in Carolene Products provides the basis
for heightened equal protection scrutiny. The Supreme Court stated
that “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a
special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching
judicial inquiry.”119 Since Carolene Products, the Court has used
“discrete and insular” as a key factor in deciding whether a
discriminatory state law is subject to strict scrutiny.120 If a law singles
out discrete and insular minorities, it is suspect. The Supreme Court
has used strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause to strike
down state regulations that have discriminated based on nationality,
race, and alienage.121
But “discrete and insular” are not the only factors the Court
looks to when deciding if a classification is suspect. “This [discrete
and insular] rationale, however, has never been invoked in our
decisions as a prerequisite to subjecting racial or ethnic distinctions
to strict scrutiny. Nor has this Court held that discreteness and
insularity constitute necessary preconditions to a holding that a
particular classification is invidious.”122 As Carolene Products pointed
119. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (emphasis
added).
120. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971) (“But the Court's
decisions have established that classifications based on alienage, like those based on
nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny. Aliens as a class
are a prime example of a ‘discrete and insular’ minority for whom such heightened judicial
solicitude is appropriate.” (footnotes and citation omitted)).
121. Id.
122. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290 (1978).
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out, discrete and insular minorities are suspect classes because they
lack political power to combat discriminatory laws. A suspect class is
“relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to
command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process.”123 The Supreme Court has also looked to whether the class
has suffered “a history of purposeful unequal treatment.”124 Of
course, being discrete and insular, and having a history of
discrimination can all be viewed as just indicators of a lack of political
power, either past or present.
2. Intermediate scrutiny
The Supreme Court has not been as clear in defining exactly
what characteristics qualify a class for intermediate scrutiny. Review
of relevant cases, however, suggests that the classes that enjoy
intermediate
scrutiny,
quasi-suspect
classes,
share
some
characteristics with suspect classes, but also have characteristics that
mitigate the discrimination or justify a certain level of discrimination.
The two classifications given intermediate scrutiny are gender and
non-marital birth.
The Supreme Court has not explicitly declared gender as a quasisuspect classification, but in recent decades, it has consistently used
intermediate scrutiny to review laws that discriminate based on
gender.125 Women in particular have suffered a long history of
discrimination, and “gender classifications . . . are usually based on
stereotypes.”126 To justify gender discrimination “[s]tate[s] must
show ‘at least that the [challenged] classification serves “important
governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means

123. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
124. Id. at 28; see also Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986) (“Close relatives are
not a ‘suspect’ or ‘quasi-suspect’ class. As a historical matter, they have not been subjected to
discrimination; they do not exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that
define them as a discrete group; and they are not a minority or politically powerless.”).
125. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532–34 (1996). In one case a plurality
opinion argued that strict scrutiny was the proper standard to apply to gender classifications,
see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682–88 (1973) (plurality opinion), but subsequent
opinions have not adopted that standard and only use intermediate scrutiny. See Virginia 518
U.S. at 532–34.
126. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 756 (3d
ed. 2006).
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employed” are “substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives.”’”127
The Court has not explicitly stated why gender classifications are
reviewed under intermediate scrutiny and not the tougher strict
scrutiny standard. Justice Scalia stated, “We have no established
criterion for ‘intermediate scrutiny’ either, but essentially apply it
when it seems like a good idea to load the dice.”128 The Court has,
however, acknowledged that inherent differences between men and
women justify gender classifications in some circumstances.129 For
example, the physical differences between men and women may be
seen to justify the military draft for men but not for women.
Furthermore, some commentators have noted that neither gender
qualifies as a discrete and insular minority.130 Thus if a lack of
political power is the driving force behind heightened scrutiny,
neither gender can claim strict scrutiny.131 But because women have
suffered through a history of discrimination and political
powerlessness, there is a need for something more than a rational
basis review.132
The Supreme Court also reviews classifications of non-marital
children with intermediate scrutiny.133 Heightened scrutiny is
justified because children in this class face a history of
127. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (third alteration in original) (quoting Miss. Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co.,
446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980))).
128. Id. at 568 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 533–34. “[T]he Court’s use of intermediate scrutiny for gender classifications
reflects its view that the biological differences between men and women mean that there are
more likely to be instances where sex is a justifiable basis for discrimination.” CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 126, at 672–73.
130. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 126, at 756 (“Also, it is claimed that women are a
political majority who are not isolated from men and thus cannot be considered a discrete and
insular minority.”).
131. “Professor Ely remarked: ‘I may be wrong in supposing that because women now
are in a position to protect themselves they will, that we are thus unlikely to see in the future
the sort of official discrimination that has marked our past. But if women don’t protect
themselves from sex discrimination in the future, it will be because for one reason or another,
substantive disagreement or more likely the assignment of a low priority to issue, they don’t
choose to.’” Id. (quoting JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 169 (1980)); see also
Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1715
(1984) (“Here, as elsewhere, a partial justification for applying heightened scrutiny is a
perception that such groups have relatively little political power, increasing the danger that the
statute in question was the product of an impermissible motivation.”).
132. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 126, at 756.
133. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
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discrimination.134 Furthermore, their status as non-marital children is
“determined by causes not within the control of the [child], and it
bears no relation to the individual’s ability to participate in and
contribute to society.”135 Despite this, the Court rejected strict
scrutiny, arguing that a higher standard was not needed to invalidate
discriminatory laws and that the history of discrimination against the
class is not as severe as the discrimination against suspect classes.136
Although the Supreme Court has not identified a specific test for
classifications that receive intermediate scrutiny, principles distilled
from the cases provide some answers. Generally, these classes have
some characteristics indicating a need for heightened scrutiny. But
they also have mitigating characteristics. For gender classifications,
women have suffered from a history of unjustified discrimination,
but the genders have physical differences which justify some
differentiation in specific laws—provided those laws do not place
“artificial constraints on an individual’s opportunity.”137
Furthermore, neither gender can claim to be a minority. Similarly,
non-marital children suffer from a history of discrimination, but the
Court felt that was mitigated somewhat because the discrimination
was not as severe as it was for other classes.
3. Equal protection for nonimmigrants
Similarly, nonimmigrants share characteristics indicating a need
for heightened scrutiny but also have mitigating circumstances. The
Supreme Court, therefore, should approach the issue of equal
protection for nonimmigrants the same way it approaches equal
protection for gender and non-marital children: use intermediate
scrutiny to review discriminatory laws.
Nonimmigrants share many of the characteristics that justify
heightened scrutiny for permanent residents. Like permanent
residents, nonimmigrants encompass a discrete and insular minority
that is politically powerless. Nonimmigrants cannot vote, do not run
for elections, and are “often handicapped by a lack of familiarity with

134. For example, non-marital children traditionally have had a tougher burden to meet
to establish paternity and impose support obligations upon their fathers. See Mathews v. Lucas,
427 U.S. 495, 505–06 (1976).
135. Id. at 505.
136. Id. at 506.
137. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
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our language and customs.”138 Aliens in general, including
nonimmigrants, have suffered from a history of discrimination.139
“Aliens as a class are a prime example of a ‘discrete and insular’
minority . . . for whom such heightened judicial solicitude is
appropriate.”140 This certainly includes nonimmigrants.
Many cases do not focus on these characteristics, but instead
focus on the term “alien.” Some courts argue that alienage
discrimination means the singling out of all aliens. These courts
distinguish state laws that discriminate against all noncitizens from
state laws that just discriminate against specified subclasses of
noncitizens.141 The Supreme Court accepted this distinction
regarding discriminatory federal laws because Congress has plenary
power over immigration.142 If applied to state laws, however, this
distinction would permit states to discriminate against
nonimmigrants as long as they do not discriminate against all
noncitizens.
The Supreme Court rejected this application. In Nyquist v.
Mauclet the Court struck down a New York state law that effectively
banned permanent residents from receiving state financial assistance
to college unless they applied for citizenship.143 The state argued that
the discrimination was permissible because it separated some
noncitizens from other noncitizens and did not separate all

138. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 102 (1976).
139. See LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 428–29 (2005) (Stewart, J., dissenting);
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 126, at 767 (“Although America is very much a nation of
immigrants, discrimination against aliens long has been widespread.”).
140. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (citation omitted).
141. See, e.g., LULAC v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 530 (6th Cir. 2007) (“This case is not
about ‘citizens’ versus ‘aliens.’ . . . The statutory classification in this case is between citizens
and lawful permanent resident aliens on the one hand, and illegal aliens and those aliens who
are not permanent lawful residents, on the other hand.”) (quoting LULAC v. Bredesen, No.
3:04-0613, 2004 WL 3048724, at * 3 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 28, 2004)).
142. “The real question presented by this case is not whether discrimination between
citizens and aliens is permissible; rather, it is whether the statutory discrimination within the
class of aliens allowing benefits to some aliens but not to others is permissible.” Mathews v.
Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976). In Mathews, “the Court was at pains to emphasize that
Congress, as an aspect of its broad power over immigration and naturalization, enjoys rights to
distinguish among aliens that are not shared by the States.” Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 7
n.8 (1977).
143. 432 U.S. 1, 3–4, 12 (1977). Although the statute did not specifically single out
permanent residents, it made eligibility for financial aid contingent upon application for
citizenship but exempted all noncitizens who did not qualify for citizenship. Id. at 3–4.
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noncitizens from citizens.144 Although the issue was discrimination
against some permanent residents but not other permanent residents,
the Court rejected the distinction in broad terms: “The important
points are that [the state law] is directed at aliens and that only aliens
are harmed by it. The fact that the statute is not an absolute bar does
not mean that it does not discriminate against the class.”145 Thus the
Supreme Court’s general use of the term “alien” does not limit
application of heightened scrutiny to state laws that only discriminate
against permanent residents specifically or noncitizens generally. And
because they share characteristics of “suspectness,” nonimmigrants
should be given heightened scrutiny for discriminatory state laws.
But nonimmigrants should not be given strict scrutiny, like
permanent residents, because the nonimmigrant class has mitigating
circumstances that either reduce the discriminatory impact of state
laws or justify some measure of discrimination. In other words,
nonimmigrants are fundamentally different from permanent
residents. Unlike permanent residents, they are not permanently
entrenched in society and do not have a long-term interest in state
laws.146 The Fifth Circuit pointed out that
[t]he [Supreme] Court has uniformly focused on two conditions
particular to [permanent resident] status in justifying strict scrutiny
review of state laws affecting resident aliens: (1) the inability of
[permanent residents] to exert political power in their own
interest . . . ; and (2) the similarity of [permanent residents] and
citizens.147

Nonimmigrants meet the first condition but are not similar to
citizens. Unlike permanent residents, they are temporary members of
the community. Therefore any discrimination would also be
temporary. Because strict scrutiny is such a high standard that
invalidates most discriminatory laws,148 states would be

144. Id. at 7–8.
145. Id. at 9.
146. An argument may be made that some nonimmigrants are a near-permanent fixture
in the United States. Those with G-4 visas, for example, could be here long enough to raise
their children and send them to American universities. Cf. Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982).
But as the Supreme Court demonstrated in Toll, the Supremacy Clause is the proper vehicle to
examine the differences between these and other classes of nonimmigrants. Id.
147. LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 417 (5th Cir. 2005).
148. “Only rarely are statutes sustained in the face of strict scrutiny.” Bernal v. Fainter,
467 U.S. 216, 220 n.6 (1984).
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overburdened in accommodating temporary residents. State laws
would be invalid even if there is an important, but not compelling,
reason for discrimination. Furthermore, nonimmigrants likely have
no long-term interest in the political process, “may not serve in the
U.S. military, are subject to strict employment restrictions, incur
differential tax treatment, and may be denied federal welfare
benefits.”149 These circumstances would seemingly mitigate
discrimination in some cases and justify discrimination in other cases.
Like courts that argue for rational basis, those courts that argue
for strict scrutiny also focus more on the general definition of “alien”
than on the characteristics of the nonimmigrant class.150 The debate
has primarily centered on what the Supreme Court meant when it
declared discrimination based on alienage as suspect.151 But the
Supreme Court has demonstrated that strict scrutiny for alienage
discrimination does not mean strict scrutiny for every class of
noncitizen. The Court has only applied strict scrutiny when
permanent residents have challenged the discriminatory state laws,
and it has avoided the issue when nonimmigrants bring the
challenge. The Court also held in Plyler that illegal immigrants are
not entitled to strict scrutiny.152
If the question was simply whether alienage discrimination
includes discrimination against nonimmigrants, the Supreme Court
could have easily provided an answer in Toll v. Moreno. The Court
did not provide an answer, however, suggesting that the issue is not
so simple.
Intermediate scrutiny seems to provide an adequate compromise
between the competing arguments that pull equal protection for
nonimmigrants to the extreme ends of the review standard. If the
Supreme Court were to declare intermediate scrutiny as the proper
standard, it could strike a balance that addresses the need to protect
nonimmigrants from unnecessary discrimination and allows the
states flexibility to accomplish important goals.

149. LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 419.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 52–59.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 45–59.
152. “We reject the claim that ‘illegal aliens’ are a ‘suspect class.’” Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202, 219 n.19 (1982).
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C. The Intersection of the Supremacy Clause and the
Equal Protection Clause

Courts face four possible scenarios when confronting
discrimination against nonimmigrants. The first is when federal law
expressly grants rights to nonimmigrants but states deny these rights.
This is the situation the Supreme Court faced in Toll. The second
scenario is the other side of this situation: federal law expressly denies
a right to nonimmigrants but a state law grants that right.153 In both
of these scenarios, the state law is preempted by federal immigration
law and there is no need to examine the state law under equal
protection. The other two scenarios require an appeal to equal
protection. The third scenario is when federal law is silent on the
specific issue and the state adopts a discriminatory law. In such cases,
state laws are not preempted but are subject to intermediate scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause. The final scenario is when federal
law authorizes states to deny rights to nonimmigrants.154 This
scenario presents an additional constitutional question—if Congress
has plenary authority over immigration and can discriminate against
noncitizens in ways not allowed to the states, can Congress authorize
states to discriminate? In other words, does the Supremacy Clause
preempt the Equal Protection Clause?
If Congress were allowed to authorize state discrimination, states
could subvert the Equal Protection Clause by lobbying for
authorization to discriminate against noncitizens. The phrase “any
person” from the Equal Protection Clause would be meaningless
because, in practical effect, equal protection would only apply to
citizens. Perhaps for these reasons, the Supreme Court has explicitly
determined that Congress cannot do this.
Although the Federal Government admittedly has broad
constitutional power to determine what aliens shall be admitted to
the United States, the period they may remain, and the terms and
conditions of their naturalization, Congress does not have the
153. A hypothetical example would be a state granting domicile status to a nonimmigrant
when Congress has expressly denied the ability to obtain domicile in the United States. See
Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647, 665 (1978) (“Congress expressly conditioned admission for
some purposes on an intent not to abandon a foreign residence or, by implication, on an intent
not to seek domicile in the United States.”). Examples of nonimmigrants under this restriction
include students, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F) (2006); temporary workers, § 1101(a)(15)(H);
and business or vacation travelers, § 1101(a)(15)(B).
154. For an example of such a law see infra text accompanying notes 156–59.

2305

DO NOT DELETE

3/10/2011 4:03 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2010

power to authorize the individual States to violate the Equal
Protection Clause.155

The proper analysis for federal laws that grant discretion to
states, therefore, is two-fold: (1) the state law does not violate the
Supremacy Clause because Congress has authorized discrimination;
but (2) the state law must still face equal protection scrutiny because
the Supremacy Clause does not legitimize the discrimination.
The following table reflects the four possible scenarios and the
structure of court decisions that follow the two-step process
advocated here:

Federal Immigration Law
Congress Grants Rights
Congress Denies Rights
Congress is Silent
Congress gives Authority
to the States

State Law
States Deny
Rights
States Grant
Rights
States Deny
Rights
States Deny
Rights

Case Outcome
Invalid under the
Supremacy Clause
Invalid under the
Supremacy Clause
Equal Protection:
Intermediate Scrutiny
Equal Protection:
Intermediate Scrutiny

IV. APPLICATION OF THE TWO-STEP PROCESS
A. State Laws that Deny “Benefits”
The Fifth Circuit in LeClerc did not follow the two-step process
described above, but it did evaluate the offending state law under the
Supremacy Clause after it had rejected the plaintiff’s equal protection
claims.156 The court, however, considered only one of the scenarios
described above: federal regulation that expressly gives rights to
nonimmigrants and whether or not the state law takes away those
rights. Some of the plaintiffs in LeClerc were in the United States
under F-1 student visas and the others were in the United States

155. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 382 (1971) (citing Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618, 641 (1969)).
156. LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 423–26 (2005).
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under H-1B temporary worker visas.157 The court concluded that the
state law in question, which denied bar admission to these
nonimmigrants, was not a direct contradiction of the regulations
establishing these visas and was not otherwise preempted by
immigration law.158 But the court did not consider whether the
discrimination imposed by the state law was authorized by Congress.
Although the conclusion is the same, a look at that analysis will
demonstrate the dynamic between the Supremacy Clause and the
Equal Protection Clause.
When Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, it also revised immigration
law.159 Among other provisions, Congress added 8 U.S.C. §§ 1621
and 1622. Section 1621 essentially prohibits states from providing
any “State or local public benefit” to illegal immigrants.160 Section
1622 authorizes states “to determine the eligibility for any State
public benefits” of other classes of noncitizens, including
nonimmigrants.161
Section 1622 does not define “State public benefits.” But section
1621, prohibiting state benefits to illegal immigrants, does define
“State and local public benefit.” Among other things it includes “any
grant, contract, loan, professional license, or commercial license
provided by an agency of a State or local government.”162 If that
same definition applies to “State public benefits” in section 1622,
then the Act can be interpreted as giving states discretion to deny
professional licenses, including bar certification, to nonimmigrants.
Under this interpretation, section 1622 is relevant to the issue in
LeClerc because it would function as congressional authorization for
the state discrimination. But Congress cannot authorize states to
violate the Fourteenth Amendment.163 The Louisiana rule denying
bar certification to nonimmigrants does not violate the Supremacy
Clause because Congress has authorized the discrimination. But the

157. Id. at 410, 412.
158. Id. at 423–25.
159. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
160. 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a) (2006).
161. 8 U.S.C. § 1622(a) (2006). The section also provides exceptions for certain aliens,
including permanent residents.
162. 8 U.S.C. § 1621(c) (emphasis added).
163. See supra text accompanying note 155.
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law must still pass intermediate scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause to be valid.
For the law to pass intermediate scrutiny, Louisiana must
establish that it has an important governmental interest in
discriminating against nonimmigrants and that the rule is tailored to
meet that interest.164 The state’s interest was “continuity and
accountability in legal representation.”165 The need to ensure that
members of the bar are good stewards of their charge is certainly
important, but a blanket rule denying bar admission to
nonimmigrants is not tailored to meet this interest.
The LeClerc court reasoned that, to meet this interest, the state
would have to “locate lawyers under its jurisdiction,” and that
nonimmigrant lawyers who left the country would be difficult to
locate.166 Also, it would be difficult for the state to discipline
nonimmigrant attorneys who fled the country after committing
malpractice.167 Although these concerns are legitimate, the rule
banning all nonimmigrants from the bar is both underinclusive and
overinclusive.
Even when using less than strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court has
struck down discriminatory laws that were underinclusive,
overinclusive, or both.168 In Jimemz v. Weinberger, the Court
invalidated an application of the Social Security Act that denied
benefits to certain non-marital children of disabled parents.169 The
policy denied benefits to non-marital children born after a parent’s
disabled condition began, even if the children could establish that
they were dependent upon that parent for support.170 The Court
found that the government interest, “prevention of spurious claims,”
was valid.171 But the policy was overinclusive because it “benefits
some children . . . who are not dependent upon their disabled
parent,” thus allowing spurious claims from other classes of

164. The law “must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially
related to achievement of those objectives.” Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
165. LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 421 (2005).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. For a discussion of overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness see Joseph Tussman &
Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341, 348–53 (1949).
169. 417 U.S. 628 (1974).
170. Id. at 630, 635.
171. Id. at 636.
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children.172 The policy was also underinclusive because it
“conclusively excludes some [non-marital children] who are, in fact,
dependent upon their disabled parent.”173
Likewise, Louisiana’s policy of denying bar admissions to
nonimmigrants is both underinclusive and overinclusive. The LeClerc
court admitted that Louisiana’s policy is underinclusive and
suggested that it would not pass heightened scrutiny.174 It is
underinclusive because unscrupulous attorneys who are citizens or
permanent residents could also leave the country to avoid discipline.
And a nonimmigrant is not necessarily harder to locate than one who
is not a nonimmigrant. The rule is also overinclusive because it
punishes all nonimmigrants for the possibility that some within the
class might commit malpractice. Also, it mandates the ultimate
punishment for this possibility. Instead of denying all nonimmigrants
admission to the bar, the state could just require that all admitted
nonimmigrants purchase extra malpractice insurance to cover the
possibility of flight. Thus, even if the Louisiana rule passes a rational
basis test, it should not pass intermediate scrutiny. The court should
have applied intermediate scrutiny and should have found the rule
unconstitutional.
B. State Laws that Create Extra Obligations
In contrast to rules that deny benefits to nonimmigrants, other
discriminatory state rules might add additional burdens for
nonimmigrants. In one case the University of Toledo required
nonimmigrant students to purchase health insurance but made
health insurance optional for students who were citizens or
permanent residents.175 Nonimmigrant students who entered the
United States on F-1 student visas challenged the rule.176 Like the
LeClerc decision, the district court evaluated the rule under the
Supremacy Clause after it had done so under the Equal Protection
Clause.
172. Id. at 637.
173. Id.
174. LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 420–21 (2005). The court used a few paragraphs
to argue that the heightened scrutiny used in Plyler was not applicable. This indicated that the
Louisiana rule would not have passed intermediate scrutiny; otherwise, the court would have
just stated that the rule would be valid even under an intermediate scrutiny review.
175. Ahmed v. Univ. of Toledo, 664 F. Supp. 282, 284–85 (1986).
176. Id. at 283–84.
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The court found that the rule did not violate the Supremacy
Clause because it “is a logical and legal extension of the policies of
Congress.”177 The court was likely correct in this conclusion. The
health insurance policy is not a direct regulation of immigration—
nothing in federal immigration law suggests that Congress intended
to “occupy the field” with respect to health insurance policies.178
Also, the policy does not seem to “stand[] as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.”179 To enter the United States on an F-1 visa, a student
must show “evidence of financial support.”180 “The federal policy
requires that these students be [financially] responsible: the
institution which the student will attend must certify that the student
is entering this country with sufficient financial resources to meet all
of his or her anticipated expenses.”181 A school policy which reduces
financial risk by mandating health insurance, therefore, likely furthers
congressional objectives rather than hindering them.
The policy passes Supremacy Clause scrutiny, but should have
incurred intermediate scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.
The court in Ahmed used a rational basis review and found that
“[t]he rationale for the policy is the protection of foreign students in
the face of medical needs which, absent insurance, could be a
potential medical crisis.”182 An additional state interest might be the
preservation of state resources by minimizing the number of medical
emergencies paid for by state funds. These justifications may qualify
as important state interests, but the court did not analyze the issue.
Furthermore, like the state policy in LeClerc, this school policy
may have a tailoring problem if it were decided today. This case was
decided in 1986, but in 2004, Ohio enacted a regulation providing
emergency medical care funding for noncitizens who do not qualify
for regular Medicaid benefits.183 This new benefit includes
nonimmigrant students. If the case were decided today, therefore,

177. Id. at 287.
178. Immigration laws governing nonimmigrant students are silent on the issue of health
insurance. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F)(i) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f) (2010).
179. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 363 (1976) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
180. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(1)(B) (2010).
181. Ahmed, 664 F. Supp. at 287.
182. Id.
183. See OHIO ADMIN. CODE 5101:1-41-20 (2010).
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the rule would be seemingly underinclusive. Nonimmigrants must
obtain more comprehensive medical coverage, but students who are
citizens and permanent residents are allowed to merely rely on
Medicaid funding for medical emergencies—why is the state not
interested in “protecting” these other students? Also, if the justifying
interest was to preserve state funds, a more effective law would be to
require all students to obtain health insurance.184
These points may be arguable, and some courts may find that the
policy does pass intermediate scrutiny, but the intermediate scrutiny
standard would require courts to take a harder look at state policies
that single out nonimmigrants.
C. State Laws that Would Likely Pass Intermediate Scrutiny
In Toll, the Supreme Court invalidated a policy that denied instate tuition to a specific subclass of nonimmigrants using the
Supremacy Clause.185 State laws creating residency requirements that
generally deny in-state tuition to nonimmigrants, however, would
likely pass constitutional review.186 “Congress expressly conditioned
admission for [many nonimmigrants] on an intent not to abandon a
foreign residence or, by implication, on an intent not to seek
domicile in the United States.”187 If states base their tuition decisions
on the domicile of the student, and the domicile rules do not
contradict federal immigration law, then the rule will not violate the
Supremacy Clause.188 The law would also pass intermediate scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause because a state has an important
interest in preserving state resources for use by residents.189 A law
184. The school health insurance policy has changed somewhat since Ahmed was
decided. Now all students who are registered for six or more credits are required to purchase
health insurance. But nonimmigrant students are still required to purchase health insurance no
matter how many credits for which they register. See UT Student Health Insurance: Overview
and Rates, UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO, http://www.utoledo.edu/healthservices/student/
health_insurance/index.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2011).
185. See supra notes 94–98 and accompanying text.
186. Cf. Carlson v. Reed, 249 F.3d 876 (Cal. 2001) (finding the state law did not violate
the Supremacy Clause and, although not applying intermediate scrutiny, finding that the law
also did not violate the Equal Protection Clause even though it denied in-state tuition to those
nonimmigrants who could not establish domicile in the state).
187. Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647, 665 (1978).
188. See Carlson, 249 F.3d at 881.
189. Plyler may stand in the way of this argument. In that case, the Supreme Court
seemingly applied intermediate scrutiny. See supra text accompanying notes 37–44. The state
asserted an interest in the “preservation of the state’s limited resources for the education of its

2311

DO NOT DELETE

3/10/2011 4:03 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2010

conditioning in-state tuition on residency requirements seems
properly tailored to meet that interest.190
V. CONCLUSION
Equal Protection jurisprudence has failed to establish where
nonimmigrants fit in the U.S. legal landscape. The Supreme Court
declared that state laws discriminating based on alienage are subject
to strict scrutiny, but the Court has only applied this to permanent
residents. Furthermore, the Court has refused to apply strict scrutiny
for illegal immigrants. Thus, “alienage” does not necessarily mean all
noncitizens, and lower courts have struggled to find the proper
standard to use when reviewing state laws that discriminate against
nonimmigrants. Some courts argue that “alienage” includes
nonimmigrants and that strict scrutiny is the proper standard. Other
courts point out that the Supreme Court has not expressly applied
strict scrutiny for nonimmigrants even though it had an opportunity
to do so. Finding an appropriate standard is difficult because
nonimmigrants are a heterogeneous class—they enter the United
States for many different reasons and under various requirements
established by federal immigration law.
For this reason, courts should approach cases of state
discrimination by first evaluating the law under the Supremacy
Clause. If the state law infringes upon Congress’s plenary power over
immigration it will be per se invalid. But state laws that are not
invalid under the Supremacy Clause must still be constitutional
under the Equal Protection Clause. Because the heterogeneous
nature of the nonimmigrant class is created by immigration law, the
Supremacy Clause analysis should mitigate the differences between
each subclass of nonimmigrants. Thus, state laws that do not violate
the Supremacy Clause will be discriminatory against a homogenous

lawful residents.” Pyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 227 (1982). The Court rejected this, stating
that “a concern for the preservation of resources standing alone can hardly justify the
classification used in allocating those resources.” Id. (citation omitted). The Court, however,
did not reject this as an important government interest, but rather found the state rule, which
denied primary education to illegal immigrant children, failed the tailoring requirement. Id. at
227–30. “[E]ven if improvement in the quality of education were a likely result of barring
some number of children from the schools of the State, the State must support its selection of
this group as the appropriate target for exclusion.” Id. at 229 .
190. Cf. Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D.C. Minn. 1971), aff’d 401 U.S. 985
(1971).
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class: foreigners who have entered the country legally and
temporarily.
And these nonimmigrants have the characteristics of classes that
need heightened equal protection scrutiny—in particular, they are
powerless to politically challenge discriminatory laws. But because
this is mitigated by the temporary nature of nonimmigrant’s
residency, states should not be burdened by a strict scrutiny
standard. Thus, an intermediate standard of review is the proper
equal protection analysis for state laws that discriminate against
nonimmigrants.
Justin Hess
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